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SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND PEREMPTORY NORMS: THE LEGAL VALUE OF
RAPE
Patricia Viseur Sellers*
Today, I will address whether sexual violence is a peremptory norm
under international law. After the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, crimes of sexual violence have
attained more visibility and received marked importance in terms of
prosecution under humanitarian law. I would like to inquire just how high
up the legal hierarchy rape has traveled, and more specifically, what is the
legal value that international law attaches to the act of rape?
Prosecution of international crimes took a giant leap forward in the
past ten years. The ad hoc Tribunals are now in the "leadership phase" of
their prosecutions. Former heads of state such as Slobodan Milosevic, past
President of Serbia, and the former members of the collective Bosnian Serb
Presidency, Mr. Krajisnik, and Ms. Plavsic' are, or will, soon be on trial.
Moreover, the Prosecutor is urgently calling for Bosnian Serbs, Mr.
Karadzic and General Mladic, to surrender or to be arrested and flown to
The Hague.
At the Rwanda Tribunal, several trials involving multiple accused,
representing various segments of society, are underway. The Media Trial
alleges that Radio T6lvison Libre des Mille Collines ("RTLM")
continuously incited Hutus to kill "roaches," meaning, kill the Tutsi
population.2 In the Government Trial, the accused range from the Minister
of Defense's assistant to various cabinet members who, the Prosecution
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Judgement, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-00-39&40/&-S, 27 (2003), available at
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alleges, initiated the political machinery of genocide.3 Other accused are
priests or pastors, highlighting the alleged involvement of persons from the
religious institutions. Previous Rwanda trials have prosecuted local
politicians and members of the business community. The ad hoc Tribunals
are undoubtedly fulfilling their mandate to investigate and indict the top
political and military leadership.
Beyond the ad hoc Tribunals, the entry into force of the Rome Statute4
and the recent functioning of the International Criminal Court assure the
likelihood that prosecution of international crimes will continue in the
future. In addition, universal jurisdiction as captured in the Princeton
Principles5 and exercised by the indictments of Spanish and Belgian
magistrates has put flesh on the legal bones of international surveillance
exercised at the national level. Have these affirmative developments
contributed to the legal value of sexual violence?
In my article, "Cultural Value of Sexual Violence," I trace the
evolution of prohibitions of sexual violence, including rape, during armed
conflict.6 I argue that sexual violence was outlawed in conformity to the
shifting legal cultural values of patriarchal society. The article posits that
sexual violence, particularly rape, is prohibited, along with other war
crimes, in order to preserve the functioning of Medieval society and to
allow, whoever won the war, the possibility to reap an intact society.
Waves of rape and other forms of destruction crippled the civil societies
that were fated to function in an age of endemic wars. Paradoxically,
Medieval wartime rape was legal when armies employed the military tactic
of a lawful siege. During a siege, rape and other crimes were part of the
legal military means to a political end.
3 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Indictment, I.C.T.R., No. ICTR 99-50-1 (1999), available at
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bizimana, Indictment,
I.C.T.R., No. ICTR 98-44-1 (2001), available at http://www.ictr.org (last visited Sept. 19,
2003) [hereinafter Government Trial].
4 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
5 See generally PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2003). See also, AFRICA
LEGAL AID, CAIRO-ARUSHA PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (2002).




I also point out in the article that according to Article 46 of The Hague
Convention of 1907, rape was prohibited during times of occupation in
order to promote pacification of the conquered population and thus reduce
the exposure of occupying forces to retaliation by civilians.7 After World
War I, because women were recognized as increasingly vital to national war
efforts and exposed to capture, the 1929 Geneva Convention that governed
prisoners of war inserted a provision to ensure that women prisoners of war
would be treated with all consideration due to their sex.8 At the end of
World War II, similar provisions were drafted into the First, Second and
Third Geneva Conventions of 1949.' In the Fourth Convention, female
civilians who fell into in enemy hands or were under occupation were
protected from rape or enforced prostitution and insults of any kind,
together with the general proscription against inhumane acts.' The
Additional Protocols of 1977 finally codified much of the prohibitions
against sexual violence during international and internal wars."
The article ends by observing that parallel to the evolving position of
women in society, sexual violence was outlawed during all phases of armed
conflict. As a result, rape and sexual violence are not only prohibited, but
cannot be condoned during a siege, justified by military necessity, nor
considered collateral damage in proportion to legitimate military acts. I
conclude by asking why, therefore, the prohibition of rape could not be
recognized as a peremptory norm.' 2 That inquiry begins this lecture.
7 id. at 318 (citing Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539).
8 Id at 319 (citing 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, July 27, 1929, art. 3, 118 L.N.T.S. 343).
9 Id. at 321 (citing Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
(hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 14, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]).
1I d. (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]).
11 Id. at 322 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August, 12 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609).
2 Id. at 324.
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Peremptory norms reside at the apex or the summit of international
law. Is the prohibition of rape among the most honored? Please note that I
will use the termsjus cogens and peremptory norms interchangeably.
To understand the origins of jus cogens, one should return to post-
Medieval Europe. Modem international law, and particularly international
humanitarian law, admits to embracing foundations that are very Euro-
centric. As noted in footnote 13 in my article, I was fortunate and very
grateful to talk to Alex Obote-Odora, a Ugandan scholar and lawyer, who
wrote his doctoral thesis on humanitarian law.' 3  Obote explained that
European-based humanitarian law emerging in Europe during the 1 3th and
14 centuries and was preceded by humanitarian law precepts from the
Middle East and Japan, dating from the seventh century, and from China,
dating from the second century.' 4 These precedents, now "earlier modern"
humanitarian law precepts, mainly military codes, regulated armed conflict
and included prohibitions of sexual violence.
Our analytic roots of jus cogens remain European-based, mainly
because international law's development of peremptory norms is wedded to
the notion of the community of states. The recognition of a community of
states started in the post-Medieval era that encompassed European countries
and disregarded the legal input of the rest of the world. The initial
international legal community consisted of European states and excluded
African, New World, or Asian states, many of which were later subjected to
European colonization.
At that juncture, and even today, the two primordial international law
principles were that states were sovereign and that states were equal in their
sovereignty. Hence, relations between states typically rested upon bilateral
accords or treaties. Two equal states, because of recognized sovereignty,
could enter into treaties that served their mutual interest. Whatever two
states agreed upon, the principle of non-interference with the affairs of
sovereigns demanded that their agreements be respected by all other states.
When emphasis would shift ever so slightly to underscore the communal
notion of the community of sovereign states, states would refer to notions
international law. Multilateral treaties as well as bilateral accords and
treaties thus were complimented by recognition of international customary
law.
13 ALEX OBOTE-ODORA, THE JUDGING OF WAR CRIMINALS: INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
14 Sellers, supra note 6, at n. 13.
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Custom is a funny precept under international law. It derives not from
an individual state, but from communal consensus. I like to refer to custom
as similar to Quaker consent - basically, everyone looks at each other and
nods in agreement. Custom is an obligation that is not necessarily placed in
writing, even if it codified by treaty law. States under customary law act
based upon that nodded agreement and indeed consider and articulate that
nodded intra-state agreement as binding law. Even though states were and
remained sovereign, with custom, states recognized obligations vis a vis
other individual states and the community of states.
Customary law and treaties functioned in tandem. Two states that
undertook a bilateral agreement that violated customary law could come
under the scrutiny of third states. These communal obligations could and
did override the ability of two states to enter into bilateral accords. To
ensure that immutable customary norms that benefited the entire
community would be respected, states started to develop notions of
peremptory norms or values that could pre-empt agreements between
states. 15
The community of states thus identified interests that served the
common good of the community, not only their individual sovereign
interests. States are much like today's co-op owners, who permit each other
to reside in separate apartment dwellings, but agree that concern for the
community of residents includes indivisible vigilance for security of
common areas such as the hallways, stairwells, or entry-ways. Jus cogens
or peremptory norms were first used to secure communal interest.
The first common hallways that intra-state relationships concerned
were freedom of the seas and facilitating the passage of intra-state
diplomacy. States were mindful of the strictures of the common good.
Why? Simply put, the passageway between many states was either by sea
or by land. States needed to ensure that the high seas and overland travel
were secure. Piracy threatened the commercial, military, and diplomatic
use of the open seas and therefore the communal good. Additionally, if
diplomatic representatives traveled overland, say, through my country to
your country, my assurance of their safe passage would in the future invoke
a communal reciprocity whenever my emissaries were required to travel
through your territory to a third realm. Today's shuttle diplomacy is quite
analogous and still requires notions of safe passage. Consequently, the
15 My discussion of the origins and application ofjus cogens norms owes exrended
gratitude to the work of Lauri Hannikainen. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS
(Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, AND PRESENT
STATUS (1988).
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entry point for the early construct of jus cogens values became the strict
outlawing of piracy and interference with diplomatic passage.
The modem concept of peremptory norms is defined in Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention. 6 The Vienna Convention is similar to the Uniform
Commercial Code that codifies the regulation of commercial agreements.
The Vienna Convention codifies the law that regulates how conventions are
drafted and interpreted. Article 53 states that a "peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character."'1
7
The plain meaning of the definition is not so plain. Article 53, in
essence, claims that peremptory norms override all other legal values
because they are the highest values that embody the interest of the
community of states as a whole. Peremptory norms cannot therefore be
derogated from and can only be replaced only by another peremptory norm
of equal value to the community.
The International Law Commission" - an august body, of gray-haired
men and for the first time in fifty years, one woman - are mandated by the
United Nations to oversee the progressive development of international law
and its codification. The Commission interprets a rule ofjus cogens to be
so overriding that it deprives any conflicting situation or act of its legality.
Ajus cogens norm automatically renders what is contrary to it illegal.
The modem examples of this grandiose supreme legal entity are the
crimes of genocide and piracy and the crimes and the human rights
violations of slavery and torture. One could readily agree that today, no
state or states could collude and enter into a treaty to commit genocide or
piracy against a third country. All states have obligations vis a vis
peremptory norms. 9 In that way, peremptory norms orjus cogens function
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
344.
171id
18 See G.A. Res. 174 (11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d mtg., at 105, U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947) (establishing the International Law Commission).
19 What is exactly the obligation that peremptory norms exact from a state, other than an
absolute prohibition to engage in conduct that violates a peremptory norm, or is not settled.
Whether states are obligated to suppress, prosecute and punish violations of peremptory
norms through national or international tribunals, or at least denounce through normal
diplomatic channels or international bodies remains unclear. M. Cherif Bassiounni states
that he, and some scholars "support the proposition that an independent theory of universal
[Vol. 34:287
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to identify and to uphold what is deemed to be the most serious and
essential values of the community of states.
Like the gradual outlawing of rape and sexual violence under
international humanitarian law, rules of jus cogens are also historically
bound, reflecting the political and legal culture of their era. I offer an
example. By 1825, the community of states acknowledged and acted upon
a legal obligation to stop the international slave trade. The international
slave trade was, by its nature, cross-boarder, but it mainly took place on the
open oceans. States were comfortable with recognizing and accepting this
peremptory norm because, similar to piracy's prohibition, banning of the
slave trade extended the regulation of maritime traffic and passageways
among countries. Simultaneously and contradictorily, halting the slave
trade was not intended to impinge on domestic institutions of slavery.
Slavery, in a sovereign's realm, remained legal because a state's treatment
of its own citizens, and particularly a state's treatment of stateless people,
disenfranchised people, i.e., slaves, did not concern other states. Domestic
slavery, including the internal trade in slaves, was not governed by
international law in the early 1800s.
Hence, the second peremptory norm of the community of states was
prohibition of the international slave trade, but not the institution of slavery.
Gradually, by the end of the nineteenth century, the abolition of domestic
slavery became widespread. Legal scholars observe that by the 1930s, the
institution of slavery and the slave trade were recognized and accepted as
being part of the same peremptory norm. Attainment ofjus cogens status
for the prohibition of slavery was pegged to overriding political and
economic interest as well as to legal values of the twentieth century. This
evolution continued with the gradual recognition and acceptance that
trafficking and other slavery-like institutions also were part of the
peremptory norm prohibitions.
With that brief background on peremptory norms, how can one
determine if the prohibition rape has attained peremptory norm status?
First, it is fair to say there exists no acknowledged, exhaustive list of
peremptory norms. What remains debate-free is that torture, genocide, and
jurisdiction exist with respect to jus cogens international crimes," leading to the conclusion
that to peremptory norms that are also international crimes, might invoke concrete option if
not obligations under a regime of universal jurisdiction to prosecute. M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Universal Jurisdiction for Internanional Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 104 (2001). Christine Chinkin notes that, "some jurist have
argued that all states have a legal interest and consequently standing to complain in
international for a about violations ofjus cogens by another state, Hilary Charlesworth &
Christine Chinkin, The Gender ofJus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 66 (1993).
2002]
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slavery are accepted as peremptory norms that can only be modified by a
subsequent norm having the same character. States, according to non
derogatory obligations, cannot commit nor condone other states that torture,
commit genocide, or enslave.
For this reason, the U.S. State Department under President Clinton,
cautiously avoided officially characterizing the upheaval in Rwanda as
genocide. Official recognition would have obligated the United States to
act. In all fairness, or more accurately in complete unfairness to Rwandans,
one has to admit it was not only the United States that refrained from using
the "G" word.
Belgium, where I live, has invoked its international obligations and has
decided to prosecute Rwandans for war crimes and acts of genocide. Two
Roman Catholic nuns and a Rwandan businessman were convicted last year
for their participation in genocide.2" Belgium did not have territorial
jurisdiction, although arguably it had in personam jurisdiction because the
accused had been hiding, and were arrested, in Belgium.2 Obligations to
uphold peremptory norms do influence intra-state actions.
It can be posited, that acts of sexual violence are already characterized
as components ofjus cogens obligations. Sexual violence has been held to
satisfy elements of torture in several cases. Under the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, rape has been interpreted as an act of torture, a human rights
violation. In Aydin, the European Court of Human Rights found that acts of
rape constituted torture in violation of European Convention of Human
Rights.22 The Inter-American Commission found in the case of Mejia that
the rapes inflicted by the security force violated her human rights in regard
to torture.23 Since the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm,
arguably, the rapes under Aydin and Mejia formed part of the violation of
that norm.
20 See Linda Keller, Belgian Jury to Decide Case Concerning Rwandan Genocide,
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 2001), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh72.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
21 See id.
22 Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 23178/94.




At the Yugoslav Tribunal, the Celebici case concerned a Muslim-run
detention center where Serbian men and women were sexually assaulted.2
Women were raped by the camp authorities. The Trial Camber held that
the rapes were acts of torture.25 In Furundzija, the Trial Chamber and the
Appeals Chamber confirmed that acts of torture, consisted, in part, of rapes
committed against a Bosnian female while she was interrogated. 6 Lastly,
in Kunarac, the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber again upheld
convictions for torture consisting of acts of sexual violence, and specifically
rape. 7 Therefore, rape has been recognized under human rights and
humanitarian law as an act satisfying the actus reus of torture, an accepted
peremptory norm.
Similarly, one can demonstrate that sexual violence, including rape, is
a component of genocide and therefore resides within its peremptory norm
protection. The Rwandan Tribunal's jurisprudence in Akayesu recognized
that sexual violence satisfied genocidal conduct.28  The Trial Chamber
found that the sexual violence was committed with the requisite intent to
destroy the Tutsi population, in whole or part. Moreover, the rapes were
committed to inflict serious bodily and mental harm to members of the
group, namely Tutsi women, as prohibited Article 2(b) of the Genocide
Convention.29
The Yugoslav Tribunal's indictments against the leadership, Mr.
Karadzic and General Mladic, and former member of the collective
Presidency, Mr. Krajisnik, allege sexual violence under the genocide
24 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgement, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-96-21/T (1998) at 7-25, available
at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Celebici case].
25 id.
26 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-17/IT (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/udgement/index.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement, 1.C.T.Y., No. IT-95-17/l-A (2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/index.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
27 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-96-23/T (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Kunarac Trial Court]; See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No.
IT-96-23/I-A (2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/appeal/judgement/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Kunarac Appellate Court].
28 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, I.C.T.R., No. ICTR 96-4/T (1989), available at
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provisions of the Statute.3" In addition, the former President of Serbia, Mr.
Milosevic, faces charges of genocide, replete with sexual violence,
including rape, for crimes committed in Bosnia.3 The Rome Statute uses
sexual violence to illustrate the genocidal act called "causing serious bodily
and mental harm to members of the group. '3 2 Certainly, rape conduct can
now be interpreted as evidence that satisfies elements of genocide, a
peremptory norm.
Moreover, sexual violence including rape can be evidence of
enslavement, an accepted form of the peremptory norm of slavery. As
mentioned earlier, in Kunarac, Bosnian women were held in a series of
detention centers. A small group of women were reduced to slavery. The
Trial Chamber convicted and the Appeals Chamber later confirmed the
conviction of two accused for the crime of enslavement.33 Ownership of the
women, an element of enslavement, was primarily shown by the relentless
and unconditional sexual access that the accused had to the women.34
Thus, rape has been interpreted to establish conduct that proves
elements of torture, slavery, and genocide under the jurisprudence of the ad
hoc criminal tribunals and by regional human rights courts. It seems
uncontested that acts of sexual violence fit within the prism of peremptory
norms. I readily applaud that eminent jurisprudence; however, I suggest the
result is a form of legal piggybacking. Prohibitions of sexual violence do
not rise on their own volition, but enters by way of a non-explicit sexual
crime, to reach the glory ofjus cogens.
Beyond these true advances, and the incorporation of sex-based crimes
in the Rome Statute, the community of states has not expressed a more
poignant interest in accepting prohibition of rape, in and of itself, as a
peremptory norm. These advances have not triggered articulation of any
overriding community interest or obligations. States still do not "act
obligated" in the face of present day massive trafficking of eastern
European women or Asian women throughout Europe, that is essentially
institutionalized rape. Therefore, my specific question still remains. Under
30 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-95-5-1 (1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kra-cai02O3O7e.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
31 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Indictment, I.C.T.Y., No. IT-01-51-1 (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii0I 1122e.htm (last visited, Sept. 20, 2003).
32 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. (6)(b).
33 Kunarac Trial Court, No. IT-96-23/T; Kunarac Appellate Court, No. IT-96-23/I-A.
34 See Kunarac Appellate Court, No. IT-96-23/1-A at 255.
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international law as recognized by the community of states, can the
prohibition of rape, standing alone, be deemed a peremptory norm?
Let us revisit the criteria for peremptory norms in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention. 35 To re-cap, in order identify a peremptory norm, there
must exist a general norm of international law that is accepted and
recognized by the international community as a whole. Norms of
international law are rules, laws, custom, or principles. They must be
universal, not just regional, norms. Peremptory norms create obligations on
all states to not engage in proscribed conduct, and possibly, if the
peremptory norm is an international crimes, to pursue, and suppress or
punish the violations. Peremptory norms do not allow derogation, nor relent
to force majeur, nor succumb in situations of emergency or distress States
cannot dissent, object, nor opt out of their obligations under the norm.
Also, the state cannot subvert or disarm ajus cogens norm by consenting to
its infliction. So, does the prohibition of rape meet the pre-requisites of
peremptory norms?
First, let us determine if the prohibition of rape is a general norm of
international law. Treaties and agreements can embody general principles
of international law. General norms could also be evidenced by customary
law. Scholarly writings or judgments, such as those of the International
Court of Justice, the Yugoslav Tribunal, or the Rwanda Tribunal are,
however, only a secondary or a subsidiary source of international law.
They do not occupy the top rung of sources of law, no matter how
important your law professor or my judges proclaim them to be. Scholarly
writings and judgments might recognize or rely upon general norms in their
conclusions, but they do not afortiori create general norms of international
law.
If conventions and custom are to be examined first to determine the
general norms of international law, what international conventions
expressly outlaw rape and trigger state obligations. First resort might be to
look to the Geneva Conventions. I sing the legal praises of Article 27 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.36 Article 27 especially protects women from
rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault of any kind during times of
occupation and armed conflict. However, neither the express prohibition of
rape in Article 27 nor the implicit prohibitions of rape in the First, Second
or Third Geneva Conventions 37 are explicitly contained in any of the four
35 Vienna Convention, supra note 16.
36 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
37 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
2002]
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grave breaches provisions. When crimes are assumed to be war crimes, and
those war crimes peremptory norms, it is the grave breaches to which
undeniable reference is made.38 Therein resides an important difference
between the grave breaches and the non-grave breaches provisions. Under
the grave breaches, states are obligated to pursue and to prosecute
violations. Under Article 27, a non-grave breach provision, persons are to
be protected from rape and other sexual violence, and states may not
renounce their protection, but the state is not further obligated vis a vis such
violations. Thus, although there is a norm to prohibit rape, there does not
seem to exist an unremitting obligation beyond protective measures. This is
a very technical, yet a technically correct reading of the Geneva
Conventions.
Today, the Geneva Conventions have moved beyond their status as a
multi-national treaty that binds only those states that have ratified their
terms. The Geneva Conventions are recognized as customary international
law. Article 27 must be seen within the body of customary law. Although
customary international law is probably a pre-requisite, it is not
automatically considered the equivalent of a peremptory norm. Even as a
part of custom, and as a recognized general norm of humanitarian law,
Article 27 does not clearly trigger the legal consequences of neither the
grave breaches nor a peremptory norm. So, while Article 27 remains alive
and harbors excellent potential use, it does not ensure the identification of
rape as a peremptory norm.
One is tempted to assert that because Additional Protocol I extends the
prohibitions of the Geneva Convention for international armed conflict and
provides for protection against rape, in Article 76, we are "home free."'3 9
Article 76 protects women from rape; however, similar to Article 27 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, it does not have the legal status of the grave
breaches provision, which is found in Article 85 of the Additional Protocol
1.40 Under Article 85, wherein State obligations are triggered, rape is not
mentioned.4
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, 74 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
38See,A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by
the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 23, citing Brownlie Whiteman and
Hannikainen.
39 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 76, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].




Additional Protocol 1142 extends the protection granted persons caught
in internal wars that was first articulated by Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. In Article 4, the fundamental guarantees, infliction of
rape, enforced prostitution, and indecent assault, are prohibited for men and
women.43 Additional Protocol II underscores that these sex-based crimes
are absolutely prohibited at all times and under all circumstances.
However, Additional Protocol II, unlike Additional Protocol I, has not been
as widely ratified. Many countries, including the United States, do not
recognize its provisions as binding under treaty or customary international
law. Although any state would be denounced if it refuted the minimum
guarantees embodied in Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II, it is also
clear that states are not universally bound by, by customary law to Article 4
of the Additional Protocol II.
Thus, the prohibition of rape is a general norm under the treaty law of
the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, and is a norm to the
extent that these treaties are recognized as customary law. The norm does
not appear to trigger consistent universal obligations. Hence, it is less than
clear that rape stands as an independent peremptory norm under these
leading humanitarian instruments.
Do the Statutes of the Yugoslavia Tribunal44 and the Rwanda
Tribunal4" assist our analysis? Both expressly enumerate rape as a crime
against humanity, following in the legal footsteps of Control Council No.
1046 that governed some of the subsequent trials in World War II.
However, the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Statutes are not multi-lateral treaties
and they purposely exercise limited jurisdiction. One recalls that the
Statutes have been criticized because they were drafted by UN civil
servants on behalf of the Secretary-General as requested by the Security
Council. The Statutes were not negotiated and then ratified by the
community of states. The Yugoslav and Rwandan Statutes therefore do not
obligate states, but only the organs of the Tribunals to prosecute, judge and
42 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August, 12 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I1].
41 Id. art. 4.
44 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993) [hereinafter Statute
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal or Yugoslav Statute].
41 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter Statute
of the Rwanda Tribunal or Rwanda Statute].
46 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for
Germany 50 (1946).
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punish international crimes. The Statutes only obligate states to cooperate
with the ad hoc Tribunals in terms of responding to subpoenas, assisting in
arrests, or furnishing documents. Clearly, those obligations do not bind
entire the community of states "act" in regard to any prohibition of rape,
nor has the ensuing jurisprudence of the Tribunals opined that the
prohibition of rape obtained peremptory norm status.
What about the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters?47 They are chiseled
in stone and lawyers tend to put their hands across their heart when citing
them, but they do not mention rape. That is not to say that sexual violence,
including rape was not prosecuted under the Tokyo or Nuremberg Charters.
When the International Law Commission formulated the Nuremberg
Principles, derived from the Charters, rape was not expressly included. The
Principles were eventually recognized as customary law. The absence of
rape compounded the ambiguity of its status as a customary norm.
During the Commission's forty plus years of formulating another legal
instrument, the Draft Code of Mankind,48 the crime of rape was not
expressly included until a re-wording of the Draft Code in 1994, in the
wake release of the Yugoslav Statute. At this stage, the Draft Code,
including the provisions on rape, could embody norms, but the Draft Code
does not have the status of a multi-lateral treaty nor emanate binding
obligations on the community of states.
By way of contrast, can the Rome Statute that includes rape under the
provisions of international and internal war crimes, and crimes against
humanity provide guidance? The Rome State was signed by a majority of
states in the modem community of states. The Rome Statute is therefore a
widely endorsed multi-lateral treaty that probably indicates general norms
of international law. It binds ratifying states to prosecute international
crimes first under their national jurisdiction and then under the provisions
of the Rome Statute. However, its eventual- customary law status,
reminiscent of Additional Protocol II, is hindered by states who remain
persistent objectors to the treaty.
47 Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Statute]; Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans
20 [hereinafter Tokyo Statute].
48 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session,
G.A. Res. 51/160, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 333, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (1996).
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We have examined the prohibition of rape as a general norm inscribed
in humanitarian law instruments. No independent peremptory norm for the
prohibition of rape has been identified. Human rights law, the other
significant body of international law, must also be examined.
With recourse to legal shorthand, I would like to list the human rights
treaties that do not list rape as a violation: The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights,
International Covenant of Economic and Social Rights, the Convention for
Elimination and Discrimination Against Women, the Additional Protocol
for the Convention for Elimination and Discrimination Against Women, the
Convention for the Child, the Apartheid Convention, the European
Convention of Human Rights, the African Charter of Human Rights, the
American Declaration of the Rights of Man. Astoundingly, none of the
leading human rights conventions expressly intone nor condemn rape as a
human rights violation nor even mention the word "rape."
A lone contrast is found in the 1994 the Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women.49
Article 2, states that rape violates a person's human rights when it occurs in
the family or in the community.50  Article 7 of that Inter-American
Convention requires the state to condemn, to pursue, to prosecute, to
punish, and to eradicate rape. 5' Article 18 only allows reservations to the
Convention that are consistent with the purpose of the convention. 52 Still,
there are notable drawbacks. Article 27 allows states to denounce the
Convention, noting that such denunciations can be recognized if they are
serious and firmly persist during the whole year.5' Also, the Convention is
regional. It binds only the North and South American states that ratify its
terms and not the entire community of states. The Convention, a welcomed
step, is not evidence of the prohibition of rape as a peremptory norm, but
rather evidence of an emerging, regional human rights norm.
Finally, one might discern norms about the prohibition of rape in the
proliferation of resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the
Security Council. The resolutions have deplored, denounced and
condemned the rapes in Haiti, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Yugoslavia and
Myanmar (Burma). The General Assembly of the United Nations is the
49 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
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embodiment of the modem community of states. The pronouncements in
General Assembly resolutions, even if driven by politics and not conceived
as treaty-law, evidence states opinion about international law and ensuing
obligations. The Security Counsel is a sub-set among the community of
states. Security Council resolutions are deemed more significant
pronouncements that tend to reflect the grave interest of the community of
states, as long as those interests of the permanent members are not
challenged, resulting in a veto. The resolutions of the General Assembly,
and the Security Council apparently identify the prohibition of rape as
squarely within the community's interest.
However, it remains difficult to determine the legal weight conferred
upon United Nations resolutions. The sources of law fixed under Article 38
of the lCJ, 54 which pre-dates the proliferation of United Nation resolutions,
and even the modern spate of international criminal courts, seems moribund
in light of states' participation in international organizations. The increasing
United Nation resolutions, possibly aiding the transforming rape into a
human rights violation, and urging its protection under humanitarian law
still fall short of accepting the prohibition of rape as a peremptory norm,
and of articulating concomitant obligations.
Lastly, the domestic law of every state in the world outlaws rape. How
rape is defined under different jurisdictions varies. It is often inclusive of
heterosexual rape and sometimes exclusive of marital rape or homosexual
rape although irrespective of the definitions, domestic law is increasingly
invoked for male survivors of rape. Unmistakably, there is a general norm
of international law derived from municipal law regarding the illegality of
rape. That general norm, of course, only binds each state to its own law.
The United States federal law on rape does not bind Mexico to suppress, or
punish or abstain from derogation in its own jurisdiction. Rape under New
Jersey state law does not obligate Pennsylvania state, other than to possibly
extradition New Jersey fugitives accused of rape. Municipal law does not
"act" to protect the overriding interest of the international community in
relation to the prohibition of rape. Hence, even the widely recognized
municipal-derived general norm regarding rape does not translate into a
peremptory norm.
In sum, there is a general norm prohibiting rape during times of armed
conflict. Suppression of wartime rapes was invoked to preserve society, or
promote pacification in occupied territories, and more recently to secure
humane treatment of protected persons. Under every domestic or municipal
jurisdiction, there is likewise a general norm prohibiting rape. Domestic




courts increasingly prosecute rape committed against a wider class of
survivors. In contrast, there is no precisely articulated international human
rights violation concerning rape even though the emerging jurisprudence of
regional human rights courts refers to rape within the violation of torture
and one regional human rights instrument explicitly proscribes it.
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention requires that a peremptory norm
be recognized by the international community of states "as a whole" and
that "no derogation" be permitted.55 It is questionable whether a general
norm of the prohibition of rape, in and of itself, in human rights law. It is
likewise uncertain that the crime rape under humanitarian law has been
considered, in and of itself, as imposing a non derogatory obligation on the
community of states other than protection against its infliction. And quite
frankly, rape has never been cited, heretofore, as a peremptory norm.
The Celebici judgment of the Yugoslav Tribunal, held rape to strike at
the very core of human dignity and physical integrity.56 Moreover, could
one fathom two states entering into an agreement to rape persons in a third
state, without the condemnation of the international community of States?
If so, why has rape, whether a commonly committed national or
international crime or perhaps an emerging human rights violations that is
never justifiable, not crossed the peremptory norm threshold? Is the
prohibition of rape's inability to meet international law's formalistic
peremptory norm requirements the gendered legacy of a patriarchal legal
culture?
I conclude by noting that in 1993, Christine Chinkin, lawyer and
scholar, inquired about the gender ofjus cogens?57 In the very least, one
observes, that in apparent legal blindness, the community of states wedded
the formulation of peremptory norms to a patriarchal vision that facially
spites its overriding interests for it proverbial nose.
Thank you very much for your attention.
55 Vienna Convention, supra note 16.
56 Celebici Case, No. IT-96-21 T.
57 See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM.
RTS. Q. 63 (1993).
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